50 Years After the “War on Poverty”: Evaluating the Justice Gap in the Post-Disaster Context by Finger, Davida
Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice
Volume 34 | Issue 2 Article 4
May 2014
50 Years After the “War on Poverty”: Evaluating the
Justice Gap in the Post-Disaster Context
Davida Finger
Loyola University New Orleans College of Law, dfinger@loyno.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/jlsj
Part of the Legal Profession Commons, and the Social Welfare Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For
more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Davida Finger, 50 Years After the “War on Poverty”: Evaluating the Justice Gap in the Post-Disaster
Context, 34 B.C.J.L. & Soc. Just. 267 (2014), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/jlsj/vol34/iss2/4
  267 
50 YEARS AFTER THE “WAR ON 
POVERTY”: EVALUATING THE JUSTICE 
GAP IN THE POST-DISASTER CONTEXT 
DAVIDA FINGER* 
Abstract: The Legal Services Corporation (“LSC”), formed as part of President 
Lyndon B. Johnson’s War on Poverty, was one of many initiatives aimed at 
providing low-income individuals with equal access to justice. Today, the in-
creasing number of people living in poverty, coupled with decreased funding for 
legal services, has resulted in a significant justice gap in the provision of civil le-
gal services. Poor people do not have the kind of access to legal services that was 
envisioned when the LSC was created. This justice gap is no more apparent than 
in the post-disaster context. For example, following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 
legal services programs in Louisiana could not handle as much as ninety percent 
of the legal needs of low-income individuals. To more meaningfully provide le-
gal services post-disaster, we must re-examine the entire system in which post-
disaster legal services are provided. 
INTRODUCTION 
The legal services initiative developed as part of this country’s overarch-
ing War on Poverty to provide, amongst a wide array of other programs, civil 
legal services to all in need and, in doing so, challenge poverty itself. Since the 
War on Poverty legal services program was implemented, disaster legal ser-
vices have been specifically mandated as a necessary post-disaster service for 
indigent people. How effectively have we as a community been able to provide 
civil access to justice, specifically in the post-disaster context? Examining ac-
cess to justice in the post-disaster context gives us a lens through which to 
scrutinize a number of related issues, including the critiques of legal services 
restrictions, the methods of funding for the U.S. legal services program, and 
the way in which the legal services program functions as a whole. The after-
math of a disaster, amplifies these foundational shortcomings inherent to the 
legal services program and its associated funding scheme. 
As a law school clinician working in the post-disaster context, I am inter-
ested in exploring ways to provide legal services to low-income people follow-
ing a disaster in a more productive and prospective manner. Many clinicians 
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provide legal services in rapid-fire situations in which emergency legal needs 
must be met. I believe that law school clinics can continue to play an increas-
ing role in providing disaster legal assistance. 
My own experience as an attorney with the Katrina Clinic at Loyola Law 
School in New Orleans following the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes has changed 
the way I think about the provision of legal services. Eight years after Hurri-
canes Katrina and Rita, our law clinic is still providing legal services to low-
income clients who continue to struggle through a variety of post-disaster is-
sues. Natural disasters are an inevitable part of our permanent legal landscape, 
and they require a continued effort to provide post-disaster legal services. 
Part I of this Article provides background information and describes some 
key issues surrounding the Legal Services Corporation (“LSC”), which was 
born as a War on Poverty program. Focusing on the Legal Services Program, 
Part II of this Article then describes how the 2005 hurricanes exacerbated ac-
cess to legal services in the Greater New Orleans area for low-income people. 
Part III then describes the laws that have created our current framework of 
post-disaster legal services. Next, Part IV of the Article reviews the loss of 
LSC funding in Louisiana in the years following the disasters, despite the sig-
nificant continuing civil legal needs of the indigent population. 
Finally, Part V of this Article discusses recommendations for structuring 
legal services programs to handle the wide scope of domestic disasters. There 
are many questions regarding how a new kind of legal services program could 
be adequately funded, especially given the ever-increasing scale of domestic 
disasters. I conclude by examining funding alternatives for post-disaster legal 
services along with policy recommendations for same.1 
I. THE WAR ON POVERTY: CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES  
With the passage of the Economic Opportunity Act in August of 1964, 
Congress established the Office Economic Opportunity (“OEO”) and President 
Johnson declared an “unconditional war on poverty.”2 Johnson’s often repeat-
                                                                                                                           
 1 In the years since the 2005 Gulf Coast storms, there have been numerous natural disasters and 
declarations of emergency. See Bruce R. Lindsay & Justin Murray, Disaster Relief Funding and 
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 11 (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.
fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40708.pdf. A number of other significant disasters followed the 2005 Gulf 
Coast hurricanes, including the California wildfires of 2007, the Super Tuesday tornadoes in 2008, the 
Samoan earthquake in 2009, the Arkansas floods in 2010, the Mississippi River floods in 2011, the 
April 25–28 tornado outbreak in 2011, the Joplin tornado in 2011, and Hurricane Sandy in 2012. See 
id. 
 2 President Lyndon B. Johnson, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 
8, 1964), in 91 PUB. PAPERS 112, 114; see Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 
Stat. 508 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2701 (1964)), repealed by Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 519 (Aug. 13, 
1981); see also History of Legal Aid, NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, http://www.nlada.
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ed quote sums up the massive undertaking of the 1964 War on Poverty: “Our 
aim is not only to relieve the symptoms of poverty, but to cure it and, above 
all, prevent it.”3 As a part of achieving this goal, the federal government began 
providing financial support for domestic civil legal services for the indigent in 
1966.4 
By 1970, the basic structure of what became the new legal services pro-
gram was established.5 Proponents hoped that this stable legal services frame-
work would be a vehicle by which to move people out of poverty.6 President 
Nixon eventually signed the Legal Services Corporation Act into law. The Act 
established and funded a separate non-profit corporation to provide “equal ac-
cess to the system of justice” for individuals who face economic barriers that 
prevent them from obtaining legal counsel in civil matters.7 
Federally funded legal services have been administered through the LSC, 
an independent federal agency, since 1974.8 Typically, LSC programs serve 
people who are at or below 125% of the federal poverty standards.9 The LSC 
provides grants to local legal aid programs.10 In 2012, 135 local programs with 
about 900 offices received funding.11 Although local programs have much dis-
cretion in determining which types of cases to handle, they often aid with 
family law, housing law, employment law, benefits law, and consumer law.12 
Considerable ink has been spilled on the evaluation of LSC programs. 
Now, fifty years after the War on Poverty, we have at our disposal extensive 
scholarly writing and empirical studies analyzing the impact and shortcomings 
of domestic civil legal services with regard to: (1) restrictions that limited rep-
                                                                                                                           
org/About/About_HistoryCivil (last visited Feb. 21, 2014) (discussing history of legal aid in the Unit-
ed States). 
 3 Johnson, supra note 2. 
 4 Economic Opportunity Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-794, 80 Stat. 1451 (1966). 
 5 Alan W. Houseman & Linda E. Perle, Securing Equal Justice for All: A Brief History of Civil 
Legal Assistance in the United States, CTR. FOR LAW & SOCIAL POLICY 12 (revised Jan. 2007), http://
www.clasp.org/resources-and-publications/files/0158.pdf (discussing the history of legal services in 
the United States); see also KRIS SHEPARD, RATIONING JUSTICE: POVERTY LAWYERS AND POOR PEO-
PLE IN THE DEEP SOUTH (2007) (discussing history of legal services in the deep south). 
 6 See Houseman & Perle, supra note 5, at 12–13. 
 7 Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, § 2, 88 Stat. 378 (1974), amended 
by Pub. L. No. 95-222, § 2, 91 Stat. 1619 (1977) (codified at U.S.C. § 2996 (1998)). 
 8 Id. 
 9 Client Income Eligibility Standards Updated for 2013, LEGAL SERVS. CORP. (Jan. 31, 2013), 
http://www.lsc.gov/media/news-items/2013/client-income-eligibility-standards-updated-2013. 
 10 Disaster Legal Services Training Manual, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY & AM. BAR 
ASS’N 29 (2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/young_lawyers/fema_
manual_2012.authcheckdam.pdf; Fact Sheet on the Legal Services Corporation, LEGAL SERVS. 
CORP., http://lsc.gov/about/what-is-lsc (last visited Feb. 15, 2014). 
 11 Disaster Legal Services Training Manual, supra note 10. 
 12 Id. 
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resentation to individual legal problems;13 (2) restrictions imposed on both 
federal and non-federal funds;14 (3) calls for restructuring policies so that law-
yers’ services become more accessible to low and middle income people, in-
cluding through the unbundling of legal services;15 and (4) explorations of 
whether legal services actually provide indigent people with the kind of holis-
tic and client-centered legal services the program was created for.16 
How civil legal assistance programs are funded is also a topic that has 
been amply covered in other literature.17 In general, funding for civil legal as-
sistance might come from a variety of sources, including the local, state, and 
federal levels of government, bar associations, law firms, philanthropic foun-
dations, state Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Accounts (IOLTA) funds, and private 
donors.18 The LSC allocates federal funds across states according to a formula 
that links funding to U.S. Census Bureau data on each state’s poverty popula-
tion.19 Reallocations based on changes in the poverty population occur as new 
census data is produced.20 
Undoubtedly, federal funding for legal services has made a positive im-
pact on poverty issues in this country. Despite this, critique of the legal ser-
vices program has been buoyed by the fact that there remains widespread un-
derrepresentation of low-income people on civil justice issues.21 Attorneys ad-
                                                                                                                           
 13 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 1608.5, 1608.6, 1610, 1612, 1617.2, 1617.3, 1632.3, 1639.3 (2011); Alan 
Houseman, Civil Legal Assistance for Low-Income Persons: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 29 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1213, 1215, 1229–33 (2001); Houseman & Perle, supra note 5, at 30, 36–37.  
 14 See Houseman, supra note 13, at 1224; Houseman & Perle, supra note 5, at 39–44. 
 15 See Forrest Mosten, Unbundling of Legal Services and the Family Lawyer, 28 FAM. L.Q. 421, 
422–23 (1994) (coining the term “unbundling” —a model by which lawyers provide representation on 
discrete legal tasks as opposed to the full range of services); see also Jessica Steinberg, In Pursuit of 
Justice? Case Outcomes and the Delivery of Unbundled Legal Services, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & 
POL’Y 453, 453–54 (2001) (discussing how “unbundling” legal services encourages legal access for 
low-income citizens). 
 16 See Houseman & Perle, supra note 5, at 49. See generally COREY S. SHDAIMAH, NEGOTIATING 
JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING, LOW INCOME CLIENTS, AND THE QUEST FOR SOCIAL CHANGE 
(2009) (discussing idealistic attorneys navigating the legal system for low-income clients). 
 17 See Houseman, supra note 13, at 1221–22; REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & AARON C. SMYTH, AM. 
BAR FOUND., ACCESS ACROSS AMERICA: FIRST REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE INFRASTRUCTURE 
MAPPING PROJECT 17 (Oct. 7, 2011), available at http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/
cms/documents/access_across_america_first_report_of_the_civil_justice_infrastructure_mapping_
project.pdf; Carmen Solomon-Fears, Legal Service Corporation: Background and Funding, CONG. 
RES. SERVICE 10–15 (Aug. 29, 2013), http://mspbwatcharchive.files.wordpress.com/2013/10/legal-
services-corporation-background-and-funding-aug-29-2013.pdf. 
 18 SANDEFUR & SMYTH, supra note 17, at 17; see Solomon-Fears, supra note 17, at 16–17. 
 19 See SANDEFUR & SMYTH, supra note 17, at 17–18. 
 20 Solomon-Fears, supra note 17, at Summary. 
 21 Documenting the Justice Gap in America, LEGAL SERVS. CORP. 1–4 (Sept. 2005), http://www.
legalaidnc.org/public/learn/publications/Documenting%20the%20Justice%20Gap/Documentingthe
Justice%20Gap_FINAL_Sept_30_05.pdf [hereinafter Justice Gap I]; Documenting the Justice Gap in 
America: The Current Unmet Civil Legal Needs of Low-Income Americans, LEGAL SERVS. CORP. 1–2 
(Sept. 2009), http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/documenting_the_justice_gap_in_america_
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dress only a small fraction of the legal needs of indigent people.22 This is 
known as the justice gap: “[t]he difference between the level of legal assistance 
available and the level that is necessary to meet the [civil legal] needs of low-
income Americans.”23 
The primary data on the LSC and the provision of legal services contem-
plates whether there is access to justice, who has it, and how large the justice 
gap actually is.24 When it comes to unrepresented litigants, however, less data 
exists on measuring self-help services in the courts and whether those services 
are meaningful enough to enable fair access to the courts.25 That our country is 
over-lawyered and the civil legal needs of low-income people are under-
served, including in court proceedings, is not news. It is also abundantly clear 
that the War on Poverty, including the creation of civil legal services that came 
along with it, has not provided a panacea to persistent poverty. 
II. POST-DISASTER CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS: CASE STUDY— 
GREATER NEW ORLEANS 
Following domestic disasters, we have learned that the burdens on poor 
people and the resulting justice gap become even more pronounced.26 If 
providing legal services to the indigent is still part of our country’s War on 
Poverty, we must better learn how to wage this battle in the post-disaster con-
text. In disaster literature, “social vulnerability” refers to “various attributes 
and conditions such as poverty, race and ethnicity, gender, age, health and 
physical ability, and housing conditions” that “place human populations at risk 
of adverse consequences from a disaster.”27 Indeed, “[f]laws in domestic poli-
cy are exacerbated by social, economic, and political inequalities. In this way, 
the social experience of disaster is a function of already existing injustices.”28 
                                                                                                                           
2009.pdf [hereinafter Justice Gap II]. At least eighty percent of the legal needs of poor people in this 
country go unmet. See Justice Gap I, supra at 4; Justice Gap II, supra at 1. 
 22 Justice Gap I, supra note 21, at 2; Justice Gap II, supra note 21, at 1. 
 23 Justice Gap II, supra note 21, at 1, 6–7 (finding that for every client served by an LSC-funded 
program, another is turned down for lack of funding). 
 24 Id. at 1–2, 5–7.  
 25 Laura Abel & David Udell, The Justice Index: Measuring Access to the Courts, MGMT. INFO. 
EXCHANGE J. 48 (2012), http://ncforaj.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/abel-udell-mie-justice-index-
article-2012.pdf. 
 26 Davida Finger et al., Engaging the Legal Academy in Disaster Response, 10 SEATTLE J. SOC. 
JUST. 211, 212 (2011). 
 27 Shirly Laska et al., Gender and Disasters: Theoretical Considerations, in KATRINA AND THE 
WOMEN OF NEW ORLEANS 11 (Beth Willinger, ed., 2008), available at http://tulane.edu/nccrow/
upload/NCCROWreport08.pdf; see Finger et al., supra note 26, at 212, 223; Robert Verchick, Disas-
ter Justice: The Geography of Human Capability, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 23, 24 (2012). 
 28 Davida Finger & Rachel E. Luft, No Shelter: Disaster Politics in Louisiana and the Struggle 
for Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES: BEYOND EXCEPTIONALISM 291, 292 
(Shareen Hertel & Kathryn Libal eds., 2011); see Laska et al., supra note 27, at 11–12. 
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Social vulnerability has become a major concern among disaster re-
searchers29 and has been, especially in recent years, widely discussed in disas-
ter literature.30 Thus, the post-disaster experience of poor people and the search 
for post-disaster access to justice must be located in this framework in order to 
have a meaningful discussion about access to justice. The theory of social vul-
nerability is a critical part of post-disaster analysis in that it allows us to inter-
pret the impact of disasters as “social and political events that are linked to 
who we are, how we live, and how we structure and maintain our society.”31 
As we consider how the post-disaster provision of legal services can be im-
proved for our country’s economically vulnerable population, an understanding 
of social vulnerability should be a prominent concern.32 
Before Hurricane Katrina, census data of the Greater New Orleans area 
showed that it was one of the nation’s most impoverished cities, located in one 
of the country’s most impoverished states.33 The predominantly African Amer-
ican population of New Orleans (over two-thirds of the city’s residents) along 
with a higher-than-average female population were both demographic factors 
that contributed to the population’s high degree of social vulnerability.34 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita created overwhelming burdens on civil legal 
services agencies and the lawyers who were providing civil legal services to 
the indigent. Legal services programs throughout Louisiana were unable to 
handle between sixty-six and eighty percent of calls for assistance.35 The num-
ber of people who actually needed assistance is likely far greater than docu-
mented because many people with serious legal needs did not or could not call 
legal services intake lines or visit legal services offices or outreach clinics.36 
Due to previously existing legal problems, it is likely that even more of 
the legal needs of indigent people went unmet following the hurricanes. Even 
without taking into account the post-disaster context, which adds multiple lay-
ers of long-term, complex legal problems, the American Bar Association 
                                                                                                                           
 29 Verchick, supra note 27, at 25. 
 30 Laska et al., supra note 27, at 11; Verchick, supra note 27, at 24–25. 
 31 See Laska et al., supra note 27, at 11. 
 32 See Verchick, supra note 27, at 24. 
 33 See Areas with Concentrated Poverty: 1999, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 3–4, 6 (July 2005), http://
www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/censr-16.pdf; Poverty: 1999, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 7 (May 2003), 
https://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-19.pdf. 
 34 Laska et al., supra note 27, at 12; see Gender: 2000, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 6 (Sept. 2001), 
https://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-9.pdf; The Black Population: 2000, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU 7 (Aug. 2001), https://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-5.pdf. 
 35 An Indicator of Louisiana’s Gap in Access to Justice, study coordinated by the LEGAL SERVS. 
CORP., available with LA. BAR ASS’N ACCESS TO JUSTICE DEP’T (on file with author). The four Loui-
siana legal services programs that participated in the study were the Acadiana Legal Services Corpora-
tion, Capital Area Legal Services Corporation, Legal Services of North Louisiana, Inc., and Southeast 
Louisiana Legal Services, Inc. Id. 
 36 Id. 
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(ABA) has posited that on average, there are 1.1 legal problems per low-
income household.37 Using this number, together with census data on poverty 
for 2008, low-income people just a few years after the hurricanes were actually 
seeking help from legal services programs for less than ten percent of the legal 
problems they likely actually faced.38 By this analysis, at least ninety percent 
of poor people’s legal problems were not addressed with the assistance of an 
attorney.39 
Moreover, record-keeping on the post-hurricane provision of disaster le-
gal services might not be fully accurate given the displacement of attorneys 
and legal services staff, the overwhelming nature of disaster legal services re-
quests, and the general disorientation following the disasters.40 The Equal Jus-
tice Works Katrina Legal Initiative documented and quantified some ways in 
which “the legal needs in Gulf Coast communities grew dramatically after the 
hurricanes, increasing burden on legal aid organizations that were experiencing 
their own impacts of the storms.”41 For example, although the number of open 
cases initially dropped when the hurricanes struck in 2005, those numbers sub-
sequently increased significantly and then remained at higher levels through 
2008 when many of the post-disaster studies were completed.42 
Legal matters directly relating to the hurricanes, such as those connected 
to housing and homelessness, insurance claims, federal and state disaster pro-
gram benefits, and contractor fraud with rebuilding, were among the most 
common types of issues.43 Other legal problems connected to the hurricanes 
such as family law, domestic violence, and drafting documents, including for 
successions and wills, were also quite pressing for an extended period of 
time.44  
As for the post-disaster need for legal services in the Greater New Orle-
ans area specifically, Southeast Louisiana Legal Services (“SLLS”) serves the 
ten parishes in Southeastern Louisiana including the Greater New Orleans ar-
                                                                                                                           
 37 Justice Gap I, supra note 21, at 13.  
 38 An Indicator of Louisiana’s Gap in Access to Justice, supra note 35. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Beth Abramson, Report and Analysis of the Provision of Disaster Civil Legal Services in Loui-
siana Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, LA. BAR ASS’N ACCESS TO JUSTICE DEP’T (Aug. 
2007) (on file with author). 
 41 SARA DEBUS & SERI IRAZOLA, DELIVERING LEGAL AID AFTER KATRINA: THE EQUAL JUSTICE 
WORKS KATRINA LEGAL INITIATIVE, at iv, vii (2009), available at http://www.urban.org/uploaded
pdf/411946_legal_aid_katrina.pdf. 
 42 Id. at vii.  
 43 Id. at iv; Finger et al., supra note 26, at 216–21. 
 44 DEBUS & IRAZOLA, supra note 41, at vii; Finger et al., supra note 26, at 221; Louisiana’s Legal 
Services Network, LA. ST. B. ASS’N 2, http://files.lsba.org/documents/ATJ/educationalbrochure.pdf 
(noting that family cases represent 49% of the cases handled statewide). 
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ea.45 SLLS handled the significant uptick in post-disaster hurricane work for 
the area most impacted by both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.46 The SLLS at-
torneys’ post-disaster work concentrated on housing and consumer issues 
across Southeast Louisiana, which were amongst the most pressing and preva-
lent matters at the time.47 Indeed, now many years following the hurricanes, 
there continues to be widespread need for legal services on disaster connected 
issues—those impacted by disasters have legal needs that continue for years.48 
How are post-disaster legal services provided? Can the ways in which 
disaster legal services are provided move this country toward closing the jus-
tice gap? 
III. POST-DISASTER PROVISION OF LEGAL SERVICES 
Until the mid-twentieth century, Congress provided funds for domestic 
disaster recovery on a case-by-case basis.49 In response to the threats of nucle-
ar war and natural disasters, federal lawmakers passed the Civil Defense Act of 
195050 and the Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1950,51 which together laid the 
groundwork for federal-to-state assistance for domestic disaster management. 
This framework, along with the Disaster Relief Acts of 196652 and 197453 
and President Carter’s 1979 establishment of the Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency (FEMA) shaped the details of domestic disaster response and 
recovery.54 Currently, the Robert T. Stafford Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act of 1988 (“Stafford Act”) governs the role of the federal government in 
providing disaster relief.55 FEMA coordinates all assistance provided directly 
                                                                                                                           
 45 See About SLLS, SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA LEGAL SERVICES, http://slls.org/about/ (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2014). 
 46 See SE LA. LEGAL SERVS., Pre-Katrina Civil Legal Needs in Southeast Louisiana—Draft 
(Aug. 2005) (unpublished report), available at http://sites.lawhelp.org/documents/3024212005%20
SLLS%20Civil%20Legal%20Needs.htm. 
 47 See Abramson, supra note 40. 
 48 Finger et al., supra note 26, at 223; Davida Finger, FEMA’s Post-disaster Grant Recoupment: 
Hurricane Survivors Still Struggling Seven Years Later, SHRIVER CENTER (July 10, 2012), http://
povertylaw.org/communication/advocacy-stories/finger; FY 2014: Budget Request Fiscal Year 2014, 
LEGAL SERVS. CORP. 18, http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/lscgov4/LSC_FY2014_Budget_
Request_FINAL_6-10-2013.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2014) [hereinafter FY 2014]. 
 49 Anna Marie Baca, History of Disaster Legislation, FEMA ON CALL DISASTER RESERVE 
WORKFORCE NEWS, Sept. 2008, https://www.fema.gov/pdf/dae/200809.pdf. 
 50 Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-920, 64 Stat. 1245 (1951). 
 51 Disaster Relief Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-875, 64 Stat. 1109 (1950). 
 52 Disaster Relief Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-769, 80 Stat. 1316 (1966). 
 53 Disaster Relief Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143 (1974). 
 54 See Exec. Order No. 12148, 44 Fed. Reg. 43239 (July 20, 1979). 
 55 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-707, § 101, 
102 Stat. 4689 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5121). In 1979, President Carter issued an Executive 
Order establishing the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 44 Fed. Reg. 43239 (July 
20, 1979) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5121). In 2002, following the September 11th World Trade Center 
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by the federal government in response to declared disasters and emergencies, 
including post-disaster legal services, as part of the federal disaster relief 
scheme.56 More specifically, 
Whenever the President determines that low-income individuals are 
unable to secure legal services adequate to meet their needs as a 
consequence of a major disaster, consistent with the goals of the 
programs authorized by this Chapter, the President shall assure that 
such programs are conducted with the advice and assistance of ap-
propriate Federal agencies and State and local bar associations.57 
 This is a broad mandate that has been realized by giving FEMA discretion 
on whether and how to provide legal services. In general, “[l]egal services, 
including legal advice, counseling, and representation in non fee-generating 
cases . . . may be provided to low-income individuals who require them as a 
result of a major disaster.”58 Non-fee-generating cases are defined as those 
cases that would not attract a private lawyer.59 The regulations also state that 
legal services may be provided by “volunteer lawyers,” “Federal lawyers,” or 
“private lawyers who may be paid by the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency . . . .”60 
Under the Stafford Act, FEMA is authorized to provide legal assistance 
for only a narrow range of issues directly connected to the disaster, such as 
insurance claims and preparing powers of attorney.61 Moreover, “participating 
attorneys” may not represent individuals in fee-generating cases, are limited to 
representing “low-income” individuals, and may only seek benefits provided 
under the Act and claims arising out of a major national disaster.62 
                                                                                                                           
attacks, which drove the U.S. reorganization on disaster preparedness and homeland security, FEMA 
joined twenty-two other federal agencies, programs and offices to constitute the Department of Home-
land Security. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135; About the 
Agency, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/about-agency (last visited Feb. 22, 2014).  
 56 See About the Agency, supra note 55. The Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 
2006 overhauled disaster preparedness mechanisms at the federal level. See Federal Emergency Man-
agement Policy Changes After Hurricane Katrina: A Summary of Statutory Provisions, CONG. RES. 
SERV. REPORT FOR CONGRESS 40–44 (Nov. 15, 2006), http://www.training.fema.gov/emiweb/edu/
docs/Federal%20EM%20Policy%20Changes%20After%20Katrina.pdf. 
 57 42 U.S.C. § 5182 (2012). 
 58 See 44 C.F.R. § 206.164(a) (2014). 
 59 See id. § 206.164(b). 
 60 Id. § 206.164(c). 
 61 Id. § 206.164(a); Disaster Legal Services Fact Sheet, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, 
http://www.fema.gov/public-assistance-local-state-tribal-and-non-profit/recovery-directorate/disaster-
legal-services (last updated Oct. 3, 2013, 10:05 AM). 
 62 See 44 CFR § 206.164(a); Memorandum of Agreement Between the Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency and the American Bar Association Regarding Disaster Legal Services, at 1, 2 (Nov. 
8, 2007), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/disaster/docs/fema_aba_
agreement_11_07.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum of Agreement]. 
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FEMA has worked to fulfill its duty to provide the Disaster Legal Ser-
vices Program primarily through the use of volunteer lawyers who are not en-
gaged to provide services until after the disaster has struck. Under a Memoran-
dum of Understanding between FEMA and the American Bar Association’s 
Young Lawyer’s Division (“YLD”), FEMA can request the YLD “to provide 
legal services to low income disaster victims in the aftermath of a ‘major disas-
ter’ . . . .”63 The YLD is charged with delivering legal services by collaborating 
with other qualified organizations including law firms, not-for-profit legal ser-
vice providers, Legal Services Corporations, state and local bar associations, 
and pro bono organizations.64 
The YLD’s ability to provide legal services is not quite as limited as it 
once was. Prior to 2005, participating attorneys were not allowed to “initiate or 
counsel disaster victims to initiate litigation against FEMA or state or local 
governments.”65 In 2007, however, the new agreement between FEMA and the 
ABA removed the litigation prohibition.66 Given the significant shortcomings 
in how post-disaster assistance was provided by FEMA following Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita, along with FEMA’s continuing effort to recoup post-disaster 
grants, the prohibition was another burden on disaster victims.67 In the years 
immediately following the hurricanes, there was a sharp increase in legal ques-
tions related to the extent and duration of assistance provided by FEMA.68 In-
deed, disaster victims’ inability to receive proper assistance from FEMA fol-
lowing the 2005 hurricanes was a major theme in Gulf Coast recovery.69 
 Although it has benefitted from partnerships with the YLD and the ABA, 
FEMA has an independent duty to fulfill its mandate to provide disaster legal 
services. Following the 9/11 disaster in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in 
New York, Professor Martha Davis raised the crucial question regarding FE-
MA’s partnership with the YLD and the ABA, asking, “whether such a purely 
volunteer-driven program meets the Stafford Act’s requirement that the Presi-
                                                                                                                           
 63 See Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 62, at 1. 
 64 See id. at 3. 
 65 JOHN C. EIDLEMAN, DISASTER LEGAL SERVICES TRAINING MANUAL 31 (June 9, 2012), avail-
able at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/young_lawyers/fema_manual_
2012.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 66 Id. The provision was removed as a result of the TRLA v. FEMA settlement. See id. FEMA 
requested that LSC help negotiate a settlement that included a new a contract between FEMA and the 
ABA/YLD to better ensure coordination of the full complement of available legal resources at the 
time of a disaster. See id. 
 67 Finger, supra note 48. 
 68 Abramson, supra note 40. 
 69 See, e.g., AD HOC SUBCOMM. OF THE U.S. SENATE ON DISASTER RECOVERY OF THE COMM. 
ON HOMELAND SEC. AND GOV’T AFFAIRS, FAR FROM HOME: DEFICIENCIES IN FEDERAL DISASTER 
HOUSING ASSISTANCE AFTER HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IM-
PROVEMENT (Feb. 2009), available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov//imo/media/doc/DisasterHousing
Inves.pdf?attempt=2.  
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dent ‘shall assure that such programs are conducted’ whenever low income 
individuals cannot otherwise obtain adequate assistance in meeting their post-
disaster legal needs.”70 Perhaps the Stafford Act, by design, simply cannot 
provide an adequate response when disaster overwhelms the capacities of state 
and local governments. 
In post-disaster Louisiana, reflection on FEMA’s volunteer-driven model 
called for better coordination and communication between state legal assis-
tance entities and the three branches of government.71 For example, the ABA 
Representative should have had a pre-arranged agreement with the LSC, Loui-
siana Bar Association, and pro bono organizations to facilitate more efficient 
and comprehensive services.72 
Notably, the LSC did not begin to collaborate formally with either the 
ABA or FEMA on disaster relief until after Hurricane Katrina.73 Since then, 
the LSC has increased its capacity to address legal needs after disasters.74 In 
the years since Hurricane Katrina, the LSC has built a stronger network to 
handle both disaster preparation and response. For example, LSC staff mem-
bers have trained the YLD’s participating attorneys.75 Additionally, FEMA is 
now tasked with making direct referrals to LSC organizations.76 The LSC itself 
also makes direct disaster assistance and emergency disaster relief grants.77 In 
2011, in response to tornadoes and flooding, the LSC provided emergency 
grants.78 In addition, legal aid programs continue to provide direct services to 
those impacted by Hurricane Sandy, which hit in 2012.79 The LSC has con-
vened the National Legal Aid Disaster Network to handle phone calls regard-
ing post-disaster issues as needs have arisen.80 In 2008, the National Disaster 
Legal Aid website was launched, sponsored by the LSC, the ABA, the National 
Legal Aid and Defender Association, and Pro Bono Net.81 
                                                                                                                           
 70 Martha Davis, Preparing for the Worst: Re-Envisioning Disaster Legal Relief in the Era of 
Homeland Security, 31 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 959, 969 (2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 5121 (2003)). 
 71 See Abramson, supra note 40. Notably, the FEMA ABA/YLD plan was implemented along 
with the Louisiana State Bar Association Disaster Response and Relief Plan. 
 72 See id. 
 73 EIDLEMAN, supra note 65, at 31. 
 74 See id. at 31–32.  
 75 See LSC’s Coordination with National Disaster Response Organizations, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., 
http://lri.lsc.gov/program-administration/disaster/coordination-national-response-orgs (last visited Jan. 
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 76 See EIDLEMAN, supra note 65, at 38.  
 77 See Disaster Relief Grants, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., http://grants.lsc.gov/apply-for-funding/
disaster-relief-grants (last visited Jan. 25, 2014). 
 78 See FY 2014, supra note 48, at 16; About, NAT’L DISASTER LEGAL AID, www.disasterlegalaid.
org/about/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2014). 
 79 See FY 2014, supra note 48, at 16. 
 80 Id. at 18. 
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IV. THE IMPACT OF DECREASED POST-DISASTER  
LEGAL SERVICES FUNDING 
In the last two decades, legal services programs have been reduced in 
scope while being required to serve greater geographic areas.82 Although the 
total poverty population in the U.S. has increased since 2000, the congression-
al allocation of funding to the LSC for legal services has not.83 Measured in 
2012 dollars adjusted for inflation, the LSC’s funding history shows that since 
1976, when the program was first funded, it has experienced an overall de-
crease of approximately $120 million allocated to its program budget.84 
In Louisiana, the LSC provides the bulk of the funding, fifty-nine percent, 
to legal services programs.85 Despite ongoing advocacy, the State of Louisiana 
provides no direct funding to Louisiana legal services programs.86 Analysis 
shows that up to a forty percent decrease in funding to Louisiana’s Legal Ser-
vices Network is to be expected by 2014.87 
Louisiana has one of the highest LSC client-eligible populations in the 
country at 25.8% of the population.88 The Greater New Orleans rate of poverty 
in 2011, at twenty-nine percent, has remained statistically the same as it was in 
1999.89 Despite the scale of the disaster brought on by the 2005 hurricanes, 
overall LSC funding since 2005, measured in 2012 dollars, dropped by approx-
imately forty million dollars.90 This is because the exodus of people from areas 
affected by the hurricanes created a net loss of the overall poverty popula-
tion.91 The funding cuts from LSC, based on the statewide poverty population 
                                                                                                                           
 82 See Houseman, supra note 13, at 1220–22. LSC funds 807 offices throughout the United 
States. 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., available at http://lsc.gov/sites/lsc.gov/files/
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 83 See id. at 2. 
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 89 See Alyson Plyer, Facts for Features: Katrina Recovery, DATA CTR. (Aug. 28, 2013), http://
www.datacenterresearch.org/data-resources/katrina/facts-for-recovery/. 
 90 Funding History, supra note 84. 
 91 Alison Plyer & Elaine Ortiz, Poverty in Southeast Louisiana Post-Katrina, GREATER NEW 
ORLEANS CMTY. DATA CTR. 1 (June 2012), https://gnocdc.s3.amazonaws.com/reports/GNOCDC_
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census data, diminished resources for civil legal services and widened the post-
disaster justice gap.92 
Although there is insufficient overall funding, the examples given here 
raise the question of whether it makes sense to continue assessing funding 
based on statewide census data, rather than more narrow regional data to more 
closely analyze poverty population shifts, especially following disasters. There 
are no special provisions regarding how disaster-impacted areas can be as-
sessed for LSC funding purposes.93 There are no caveats in the current scheme 
for how LSC funding is allocated and how the overall poverty population is 
measured for disaster-impacted areas, even when there has been a temporary 
out-migration during the recovery and rebuilding phases. Although the LSC 
can provide some stop-gap measures, such as emergency grants, we know that 
post-disaster legal work stretches for extended periods of time and is not likely 
to be nearly completed on short-term grant funding cycles. 
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POST-DISASTER LEGAL SERVICES 
National organizations call for increased funding to the LSC in order to 
continue funding legal services programs. For example, the LSC itself has re-
quested an additional sixteen million dollars for 2014 appropriations in recog-
nition of the vast increase in the U.S. poverty population, which is at an all-
time high.94 The National Center for Access to Justice has highlighted new 
models to provide alternatives to lawyers such as help desks, pro se clerk’s 
offices, computer kiosks, forms, call centers, and the use of non-lawyer staff.95 
The National Legal Aid and Defender Association continues to play a key role 
in advocacy for both federal funding and state funding so sorely needed in 
Louisiana.96 
Additionally, the ABA, in line with the “Civil Gideon” movement, calls 
for the expansion of the right to counsel in civil cases involving basic human 
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needs.97 Answering the calls for additional funding and a commitment to a civ-
il right to counsel would expand the provision of legal services, especially in 
the post-disaster context. Questions remain, however, with regard to how to 
provide more holistic and ongoing legal services for the indigent. Can the 
model of how our country provides legal services be updated, as Professor 
Martha Davis queried, so that legal services are no longer “a besieged holdo-
ver from the War on Poverty, but an important, contemporary aspect of our 
nation’s response to disaster . . . .”98 
The Sandy Recovery Act of 2013 authorized changes to FEMA’s disaster 
assistance program.99 Under this Act, the Administrator of FEMA is required 
to develop a national strategy “for reducing future costs, loss of life, and inju-
ries associated with extreme disaster events in vulnerable areas of the United 
States.”100 None of these changes, however, necessarily focus on improved 
models for the delivery of disaster legal services.101  
The delivery of disaster legal services should be part of this new national 
strategy mandate. In discussing FEMA’s role after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 
Professor Martha Davis noted that, “[a]lthough the Stafford Act provides the 
president and federal government with the means to grant funding and assis-
tance to states for legal services, it has yet to utilize these means toward an 
effective end.”102 FEMA must be agile; the agency must be able to implement 
procedures that make sense for the scale of disaster at hand. Professor Davis 
asked: (1) what it would cost to provide disaster victims more institutionalized 
legal services nationally? (2) how would those funds be administered? (3) 
whether LSC, rather than a new institution, should administer legal aid to dis-
aster victims? (4) would involving Legal Services further pro bono services? 
and (5) would disaster legal services overwhelm LSC-funded organizations?103  
More than ten years later, these questions remain as important as ever to 
explore and attempt to answer. As a preliminary matter, FEMA, with LSC as a 
partner, must analyze the possible approaches to resolving this problem. A 
taskforce charged with learning more about disaster legal services, soliciting 
community input, and making policy recommendations would be a useful 
                                                                                                                           
 97 This movement has aimed to sidestep the Supreme Court’s 1981 decision in Lassiter v. De-
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 98 Davis, supra note 70, at 965 (footnote omitted). 
 99 See Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of January 29, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-2, 127 Stat. 4. 
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starting point. A range of stakeholders must be involved. Attorneys who have 
worked through previous disasters to provide disaster legal assistance should 
be an integral part of this process. To engage critically with new ideas on dis-
aster legal services, it is also important that those who have lived through do-
mestic disasters, the post-disaster bureaucracy, and those who hold communi-
ty-level leadership positions be firmly engaged as well. In fact, we must 
achieve greater citizen participation with disaster recovery in general. 
Knowing that recent disasters have brought massive problems in our 
country that have overwhelmed many communities, perhaps it is time to again 
reconsider the current framework that gives discretionary involvement to the 
federal government without guarantees of specific assistance at the local and 
state levels. More comprehensive policies with enforceable guarantees for dis-
aster victims would allow for more humane long-term responses to the types of 
needs communities face after disasters.104 
For example, international human rights standards could be used as a 
framework to achieve post-disaster guarantees beyond the narrow range of 
provisions of the Stafford Act.105 “A disaster response governed by human 
rights norms prioritizes and guarantees post-disaster shelter and humane, dig-
nified treatment of displaced persons.”106 This would create a paradigm shift in 
terms of national focus, broad support, and unified political will to disaster 
issues, along with building leadership that is deeply engaged with promoting 
and ensuring government transparency. 
Most importantly, FEMA should consider new methods to fulfill its role 
in providing disaster legal services. Exploring fresh, creative possibilities re-
quires a long-term outlook on post-disaster legal services and a commitment to 
meeting the civil legal needs of low-income people. To this end, FEMA should 
expand its partnerships on federal, state, and community levels. First, the 
agency should provide funding to LSC so that LSC offices may choose to pro-
vide the agency with feedback and comments on disaster policy. Moreover, 
LSC offices could, with funding, more meaningfully participate in the ongoing 
training of volunteer attorneys so that when disaster hits, there is a cadre of 
trained attorneys available. FEMA should provide regular written and webinar 
updates to all LSC offices regarding post-disaster programs so that as FEMA 
creates policy and program changes from disaster to disaster, LSC offices 
around the country remain up to date. FEMA should also fund specific net-
works of LSC offices to establish disaster assistance departments that would, 
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in turn, develop expertise and advise and guide other LSC offices as needed 
following disasters.  
Moreover, FEMA should establish partnerships with and fund additional 
non-LSC pro bono legal services organizations that serve low-income people 
as a means to build capacity beyond LSC organizations. FEMA should priori-
tize building networks of community organizations that provide legal services 
organizations with fact-finding tools to assist in the provision of legal aid to 
low-income people after disasters. FEMA should establish a stronger, perma-
nent, on-the-ground regional presence to better assure that post-disaster infor-
mation is clear and accurate. Finally, mediation services for individual disaster 
assistance recipients should be funded as part of the disaster legal services 
budget.107 Any of these approaches would enable greater access to legal ser-
vices for indigent populations in the aftermath of disasters. 
CONCLUSION 
To address the post-disaster justice gap, we must renew our commitment 
to the contemporary War on Poverty. Rebuilding any community after a disas-
ter involves a myriad of legal issues, many of which cannot be known in ad-
vance. To provide post-disaster legal services to the most vulnerable members 
of our communities, we must engage in collective strategic planning. Because 
we cannot predict where the next disaster will hit, the time is now to work col-
laboratively for a comprehensive post-disaster policy that meaningfully ac-
counts for the provision of civil disaster legal services. 
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